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The question boils down to this: Should the revision go over the same ground of SE-27. ie. the current status communication and effectivenesses of controls on trade with Communist China and the probable effectiveness of additional measures,...which in SE-27 were full embargo, blockade, and aerial interdiction of lines of communication within China. Should the scope be broadened to include other courses of action... or should it be narrowed to consider only the current status and effectivenesses of controls and the probable effectiveness of a blockade.

Another related process problem is the question of the relationship of the SE-27 revision to NIE-80 which, in its terms of reference, calls for a consideration of the effect on Communist courses of action in Korea of certain mossible US courses of action including blockade and bombardment.

Yesterday there appeared to be considerable sentiment for restricting the SE-27 revision to the blockade question and perhaps removing it from NIE-80. COM There was also discussion of the possiblility of taking care of the SE-27 problem by treating it in an appendix to NIE-80.

I doubt that an appendix treatment would be satisfactory to the consumer -if there is indeed a consumer for the special problem of SE-27. SE-27 is larger in scope 200 than NIE-80 in that it deals not only with the effects on CC capabilities in Korea but should assess the consequences in terms of the effects on CC's long term, overall power potential. I am also not sure that restricting SE-27 to blockade would be a safe bet at this point, since I read in last night's Star that a complete 60000 embargo is now being considered. Since we are leading from ignorance of what -if anything- is being considered, it might be safer to attempt the full treatment. I think we should try for a little additional time, however, if we are going to do a full and complete revision of SE-27.



Jeg